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Recent years have seen the idea of mediatisation promoted as a unifying concept capable of 
overcoming the increasing specialisation and fragmentation of communication research 
and addressing the increasing ubiquity and centrality of media across all areas of insti- 
tutional and intimate life. Advocates present it as media centred but not media centric, 
arguing for inquiry that explores the interconnections between innovations in media and 
wider social and cultural change. While shifts in the organisation of economic activity are 
referenced, mediatisation research has not so far developed a comprehensive analysis of 
the central role played by the resurgence of market fundamentalist models of capitalism 
in reorganising the relations between media and social and cultural life it seeks to address. 
Through a close reading of key writings on mediatisation, this article demonstrates the 
necessity of integrating a critical political economy into its core project. 
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Introduction 
One variant of the popular parable recounts how a group of men, stumbling across an 
elephant in a pitch-dark room and unable to see the animal, set out to build a picture of its 
overall shape by exploring its body. Each feels a different part and comes to a different con- 
clusion. After a period of argument they agree to pool their impressions in the hope of pro- 
ducing a more complete account. 
Media and communications inquiry has followed a similar path with the field splinter- 
ing into an ever-expanding range of specialisms. Faced with the ubiquity of digital media 
and their accelerating integration into intimate and institutional life at every level, from 
the presentation of the self to the organisation of state surveillance and military strikes, 
this fragmentation of attention and effort has appeared less and less adequate for under- 
standing the role media now play in contemporary societies. The growing sense that “some- 
thing is going on with media in our lives, and it is deep enough not to be reached simply by 
accumulating more and more specific studies” (Couldry and Hepp 2013, 191), has prompted 
a search for a new integrative framework and, after the usual battles over labels, mediatisa- 
tion has emerged as the favoured approach to detailing the range of “transformations in the 
nature of contemporary social order linked to the affordances and uses of media” (Couldry 
2014, 38). 
An integrative perspective requires a strong commitment to connecting analysis con- 
ducted at different levels and exploring the interplay between situated action and structural 
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 conditions. Stig Hjarvard (2011, 121), one of mediatisation theory’s main proponents, claims 
that unpacking “the interaction and transaction between actors and structures” is one of the 
project’s central ambitions. His own research, however, has tended to operate at the level of 
institutional change, employing a variant of Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory to 
explore how media processes have become increasingly “integrated in the operations of 
other social institutions and cultural spheres” (Hjarvard 2013, 17) pressuring them to 
adapt to and work with the “logic” embedded in the “various operational modalities by 
which media enable, limit and structure human communication and action” (Hjarvard 
2011, 123; original emphasis). Despite the reference to structures as enabling as well as con- 
straining, advocates of the other main current of mediatisation research—which focuses on 
transformations in everyday life and draws on social constructionist perspectives—see the 
notion of inherent media “logics” as overly directive and leaving too little room for the diver- 
sity and creativity of situated agency. As Andreas Hepp has argued, “The conception of 
mediatization as the propagation of a ‘media logic’ involves a reification, placing the 
process beyond human agency” and presenting it as “something that ‘happen’ all by 
itself … not something that we ourselves create” (Hepp 2016, 927). He describes his own 
work as a concerted attempt to “open the ‘black box’ of media related logic(s) and introduce 
a more empirically grounded actor perspective into our analysis” (2016, 920). 
In his foundational essay, Winfried Schulz (2004, 90) argues that the core meaning of 
mediatisation lies with the ways that the technological, semiotic and economic character- 
istics of various media became increasingly central to both personal and institutional prac- 
tices. Subsequent work has paid sustained attention to media as arrays of technologies and 
systems of representation. Schulz emphasises how, “as media use becomes an integral part 
of private and social life, the media’s definition of reality amalgamates with the social defi- 
nition of reality”, reshaping everyday understandings of the world (2004, 89). Other writers 
have focused on the processes “through which media technologies and related artefacts 
become indispensable to people in the everyday lives” (Jansson 2014, 273). In contrast, 
mediatisation theorists have mostly ignored the third dimension of Schulz’s model: the 
“economic”. 
Economic shifts and dynamics are mentioned but there has been no systematic 
attempt to explore the intersections between the increasing integration of media into 
social and cultural life and the transformation of modern capitalism from welfare to 
market fundamentalist models. In some ways this is a surprising omission because 
writers on mediatisation are at pains to stress that while their particular expertise lies 
with unpacking the “transformative potential” of media, they see this as contributing to a 
“holistic understanding of the various intersecting forces at work” in reshaping contempor- 
ary societies (Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2015, 316). This emphasis on transformation 
necessarily defines mediatisation as a process unfolding over time, and despite their differ- 
ences researchers in the field are united in “interpolating media analysis into the larger story 
of modernity” (Lunt and Livingstone 2015, 5). The problems begin with the conception of 
modernity underpinning this ambition. 
 
 
 
Modernity and Capitalism 
Some writers see mediatisation, understood as the progressive temporal, spatial and 
social spread of mediated communication (Krotz 2009), as a “process that has more or less 
 been accompanying the whole history of mankind” (Hepp and Krotz 2014, 10). Others date 
the increasing “social and cultural relevance” of media from the “emergence of so-called 
‘independent’ mass media” (Hepp and Krotz 2014, 10). The majority of commentators, 
however, follow Hjarvard (2013, 18) in seeing mediatisation as a distinctive feature of the 
“late” or “high” modernity that crystallised in the second half of the twentieth century. 
For Winfried Schulz, the decisive moment comes with television’s installation as a ubiqui- 
tous and central presence in domestic life, prompting him to suggest that it “would be 
more appropriate to use the label ‘televisualisation’ for recent socio-political changes” 
rather than mediatisation (Schulz 2004, 94). The subsequent emergence of the Internet 
as a mass utility and the migration of access from laptops to mobile devices have led 
recent writers to nominate smartphones and tablets as the new pivots of mediatised 
modernity. 
These accounts are grounded in a model of modernity that presents it as the product 
of a series of interlinked but separate transformative meta-processes which enjoy more or 
less equal analytical status and explanatory purchase. Alongside mediatisation the list typi- 
cally includes urbanisation, globalisation and individualisation (see, for example, Krotz 2007; 
Hjarvard 2011, 120). This model pointedly ignores the primacy of capitalist dynamics in 
shaping the central contours of modernity. 
While the major cities and empires of the ancient and mediaeval worlds point to sig- 
nificant histories of urbanisation and globalisation that pre-date the rise of modern capital- 
ism, their contemporary forms have been fundamentally moulded by capitalist dynamics. 
The leading urban centres of the contemporary world have been constructed around indus- 
trial, financial, trading, export and administrative hubs that service capital. Present patterns 
of globalisation have been indelibly marked by capitalist colonisations and imperialisms 
and their legacies. Under the relentless drive to maintain models of growth predicated 
on ever-increasing levels of personal consumption, conceptions of individuality have 
been progressively annexed by capitalism’s core ideology of possessive individualism. 
Writers on mediatisation often include economic dynamics in their inventories of con- 
temporary transformative processes under the heading of “commercialisation”, but shifts in 
the organisation of the media system since the mid-1970s are never located within a more 
comprehensive account of the wider transformation of capitalism and its multiple impli- 
cations for the organisation of economic and symbolic power. This absence appears like 
a ghost haunting recent commentaries by leading writers on mediatisation. In their 
efforts to compile a more complete account of the elephant they have neglected to ask 
who owns and trains it and what it is doing in the room. 
As Andreas Hepp and Friedrich Krotz acknowledge, “a critical analysis of the inter- 
relation between the change of media and communication, on the one hand, and the 
change of culture and society on the other” (Hepp and Krotz 2014, 7) cannot take “media 
unquestioned as the source of change” and must give serious consideration to the possi- 
bility that “the driving force of change might not be the media at all” (2014, 10). In an 
earlier commentary, Krotz goes one step further, arguing that although the relations 
between the core dynamics of modernity are complex with each having its own logic of 
development, “in a capitalistic world all such meta-processes depend on the economic 
dimension” and “thus commercialisation is the basic process providing the stimulus to all 
action” (Krotz 2007, 259). If this is the case then accounts of mediatisation, whether 
focused on the shifting organisation of institutional relations or the changing textures of 
every life and interaction, must necessarily engage fully with the transformation of 
 contemporary capitalism and its consequences for the organisation of media and communi- 
cations. Major economic shifts have forced their way into accounts of mediatisation but 
have been quickly passed over. The growing concentration of ownership over key com- 
munications facilities is a case in point. In a recent paper, Andreas Hepp and colleagues 
concede that “we might explain … the concentration of media organisations and owner- 
ship … by certain economic driving forces” (Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2015, 320) but 
they do not go on to relate these “driving forces” to the wider transformations generated 
by capitalism’s turn to marketisation. 
As Wolfgang Streeck has argued, “capitalism denotes both an economy and a society, 
and studying it requires a conceptual framework that does not separate the one from the 
other” (2016, 201). However, as he goes on to stress, “calling a society capitalist also implies 
that it is ‘a society continually’ at risk of the social relations governing the economy pene- 
trating into and taking possession of previously non-capitalist social relations” (2016, 202). 
The period since the mid-1970s has seen precisely this process gather increasing momen- 
tum within the mature capitalist societies of the West, with far-reaching consequences for 
the organisation of communication systems and their role in the process of accumulation. 
 
 
 
 
From Mediatisation to Marketisation 
In the mid-1970s advanced capitalist economies experienced a severe structural crisis 
of profitability which opened the way for neo-liberal critiques of state intervention and 
management to gain increasing traction. The resulting ideological and practical promotion 
of private enterprise and markets was pursued with particular vigour and force in the major 
strongholds of the Anglo-American variant of capitalism, Great Britain and the United 
States, under the direction of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, but elements of this 
marketised response to crisis also gathered increasing momentum within the European 
Union. The result was a fundamental rebalancing of the relations between states and 
markets that had characterised the post-war welfare model of capitalism constructed 
around strong regulation of private enterprise, a redistributive tax system and significant 
public investment in the core material and cultural resources required for full citizenship. 
Its displacement by a marketised model has been the defining force reshaping the contem- 
porary communication system addressed in the mediatisation literature. 
The pursuit of market fundamentalist responses to the crisis of profitability has had 
three major impacts on the organisation of media. 
Firstly, and most obviously, these responses have very significantly increased the 
control that private corporations exercise over both the essential infrastructural supports 
for networked communication and the organisation, production and public circulation of 
information and cultural expression. Telecommunications systems that were previously 
public utilities or strongly regulated monopolies have been privatised and moved into 
the market sector. There has been no restriction on Google and Facebook building their 
own proprietary networks. The dilution or suspension of limits on media ownership has con- 
centrated content production and distribution in the hands of a diminishing number of 
mega conglomerates, while the absence of effective regulation of corporate concentration 
on the Internet, coupled with network effects that favour dominant players, has ceded 
control over core uses to effective monopolies or duopolies. 
 As a mounting number of studies have demonstrated, over the last three decades 
control over the global production and distribution of news and entertainment has 
become progressively concentrated in the hands of a steadily shrinking number of major 
communications conglomerates with interests across the whole range of print and audio 
visual media (see Bagdikian 2004; Birkinbine, Gomez, and Wasko 2017). This pattern has 
been repeated in intensified form in digital media, with the core areas of popular Internet 
use commanded by one or two dominant players: Google in search; Facebook in social 
media; Amazon in online retailing; and Apple and Microsoft in personal computing. 
These companies are not simply central to the contemporary communications system; 
they are at the heart of the emerging general economy of advanced capitalism. 
Figures for 2016 show Apple, Alphabet (Google’s holding company) and Microsoft 
occupying the top three places in the list of world’s largest companies by market capitalisa- 
tion, with Amazon in sixth place and Facebook seventh (The Economist 2016, 5). The 
dynamics propelling this seismic shift in economic and symbolic power are not investigated 
in detail in the mediatisation literature. 
Alongside this unprecedented consolidation of corporate control, public marketisa- 
tion polices have eroded the power and autonomy of cultural institutions that previously 
provided counterbalances to the commercial annexation of public culture. Their funding 
from taxation has been progressively squeezed and they have come under increasing 
pressure to become more commercially minded. Museums find themselves unable to 
mount major exhibitions without significant corporate sponsorship. Public service broad- 
casters are continually urged to maximise the monetary value of their assets by aggressively 
selling programming and formats in overseas markets and exploiting the merchandising 
potential of popular shows. 
The commercialisation of cultural production has been matched by the redirection of 
audience attention and use. One of the constituent causes of the mid-1970s crisis profitabil- 
ity was the exhaustion of the mass production system that had sustained rising growth in 
the post-war period. The corporate response was four-fold (see Murdock 2014). Firstly, 
product standardisation gave way to differentiation and the increasing segmentation of 
markets by taste niches. Secondly, the obsolescence cycle was accelerated so that artefacts 
and styles became unfashionable at an increasing rate and had to be replaced. This new 
disposability was reinforced by the short shelf-life of spare parts and the disappearance 
of local repair facilities. Thirdly, the basis of product promotion shifted from price and 
utility to evocations of the centrality of commodities to lifestyles and personal identities. 
Fourthly, the stagnant or falling levels of household spending power resulting from the cor- 
porate suppression of wages and attacks on the collective bargaining power of trade unions 
were compensated for by a massive extension of personal borrowing on credit and store 
cards. 
The rapid roll-out of new commercial media since the mid-1970s, with the introduc- 
tion of cable and satellite channels and later the Internet, provided the primary support for 
this new consumer regime, both quantitatively, by massively expanding the space available 
to advertising, and qualitatively, by facilitating new integrated, interactive and immersive 
forms of product promotion. The impacts, however, have been uneven. The business 
model of the major Internet sites, based on harvesting and analysing users’ personal data 
to develop more finely targeted and personalised marketing strategies, has proved remark- 
ably successful and, as we noted earlier, positioned Google and Facebook among the 
world’s leading corporations. At the same time, their rise has placed established media 
 sectors that rely on advertising revenues under increasing financial pressure, intensifying 
their search for audience maximisation. 
Looking across the range of current writing on mediatisation, however, we find that 
these impacts of marketised capitalism are either not mentioned or appear only in passing 
and are never fully engaged with. 
 
 
 
From Media Logics to Corporate Logics 
The institutional variant of mediatisation theory is based on claims that late moder- 
nity in democratic societies has seen a double movement whereby “media acquire the 
status of social institutions in their own right” but are, at the same time, increasingly “inte- 
grated into the operations of other social institutions and cultural spheres” (Hjarvard 2013, 
17) which then become “to some extent dependent on the logic of the media” (Hjarvard 
2011, 119) 
This argument borrows from Altheide and Snow’s influential conception which ident- 
ifies media logic with the presentational formats employed by various media to structure 
“how material is organised, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on par- 
ticular characteristics of behaviour” and argues that format provides the central “framework 
or perspective that is used to present as well as interpret phenomenon” (Altheide and Snow 
1979, 10). Any individual or agency seeking to secure favourable publicity and mobilise 
public support is necessarily engaged in a three-way struggle: for voice and visibility; for 
legitimacy; and for precedence. It is a struggle to control the terms on which they are 
seen and heard and, where necessary, to suppress the circulation of negative imagery 
and damaging information. It is a struggle to be taken seriously. It is a struggle to install 
one’s views or persona as the accepted point of reference against which all other alterna- 
tives and challenges are judged. Under conditions of capitalist modernity, mass media have 
become the major arenas in which these struggles are fought out. 
As Stig Hjarvard, the main mediatisation theorist working with the idea of media logic, 
is careful to point out, however, “By the term … we do not imply a singular, uniform logic that 
resides behind every level of media activity” and analysis “must take the specific features of 
the media in question into account” (Hjarvard 2011, 123). Different media formats and genres 
provide different spaces of expression and different mechanisms of exclusion. News relies 
predominantly on official sources and is therefore relatively “closed” as a cultural form, 
whereas fictional genres may offer more openness to the exploration of alternative and oppo- 
sitional discourses and viewpoints (see Schlesinger, Murdock, and Elliott 1983). 
Writing on mediatisation, however, has tended to follow the central tendency in pol- 
itical communications research more generally and focus primarily on the interplay 
between the organisation of news and the communication strategies of politicians and pol- 
itical parties. The core assertion is simple. As the media have become increasingly central to 
cultural life, so “politicians and political institution have become increasingly dependent” on 
them to command public attention (Strömbäck and Van Aelst 2013, 342) and in the process 
have moved from adapting to media logics to adopting them so that “standards of news- 
worthiness become a built in part of the governing process” (Strömbäck 2008, 239–240). 
The political logics and skills that previously determined communicative strategies are 
replaced by media logics that dictate the staging of events and the timing and form of 
announcements. 
 Powerful empirical support for this argument is provided by Daniel Hallin’s (1992, 5) 
demonstration that in the two decades between 1968 and 1988 the average length of quo- 
tations from candidates in Presidential elections on US network newscasts shrunk from 40 
seconds to 10 seconds. He sees this movement towards greater compression as driven by 
two intersecting shifts. In the political sphere, the erosion of traditional party loyalties 
placed a greater emphasis on using the techniques of marketing and advertising to “sell” 
positions and policies in an increasingly competitive political marketplace. In the media 
sphere, increased competition from the rise of cable television put the established broad- 
cast networks under increasing pressure to maintain ratings, prompting them to adopt a 
more entertainment-orientated approach to coverage. The result, Hallin argues, is to 
present electoral competition as a horse race, with peaks and spills, and to emphasise 
the personalities of candidates rather than the underlying issues addressed in competing 
policy platforms. As Donald’s Trump’s 2016 Presidential campaign illustrates, this process 
has intensified since Hallin’s study. 
There is now general agreement that Trump typifies the recent turn to populist poli- 
tics across a number of western democracies. Ideologically his campaign drew on the classic 
populist opposition between a put-upon “people” and an out-of-touch establishment that 
had denigrated their core values and undermined their living standards. His career as a suc- 
cessful businessman with no political experience allowed him to present himself as an “out- 
sider”, unconnected to the dominant policy elites and absolved from blame for their 
failures, and as someone with a proven ability to get things done. Dismissing the claims 
of experts as unreliable and driven by special interests, he celebrated gut instinct and 
the wisdom of “common sense” grounded in lived experience. 
In orchestrating these ideological appeals, Trump drew on what Moffit and Tormey 
see as populism’s defining political style, deliberately disregarding “‘appropriate’ ways of 
acting in the political realm”, resorting to calculatedly disruptive behaviour and displaying 
a “heady combination of charisma [and] political incorrectness” (Moffitt and Tormey 2014, 
392 and 393). His performances drew on his experience and persona as the host of the long- 
running US version of the game show The Apprentice, designed to select managers for his 
portfolio of companies. He became famous for his acerbic and dismissive comments on 
unsuccessful contestants, and the show’s catch-phrase “You’re fired” perfectly encapsulated 
his central campaign promise to purge Washington of the experts and bureaucrats he 
claimed had failed “the people”. 
Writers working within a mediatisation perspective would be inclined to follow Jesper 
Strömbäck in arguing that these findings confirm the installation at the heart of contempor- 
ary public culture of a “media logic” promoting “news values and storytelling techniques” 
organised around “simplification, polarization, intensification, personalisation” (Strömbäck 
2008, 233). Far from complying with the requirements of standard media formats, 
however, throughout his campaign Trump adopted an adversarial stance towards the main- 
stream news media, including them on his list of “liberal” establishment institutions driven 
by self-interested agendas. He chose instead to communicate directly with supporters, 
speaking at a continuous series of rallies across the country and using his Twitter 
account on a daily basis to float policy proposals, comment on opponents and issue rebut- 
tals to criticisms. These performances set the media agenda. 
Confronted with a campaign that was light on sustained discussion of key issues and 
organised around Trump’s personality and provocative statements, the US broadcast net- 
works had two choices. They could provide considered analysis of the core issues facing 
 the country or they could collude with Trump’s orchestration of his campaign. As Nicholas 
Kristof has pointed out, they chose “complicity since such tactics were easy to shoehorn into 
ratings pleasing entertainment structures” and “everyone knew that Trump was ratings 
gold, where a segment on poverty was ratings mud” (Kristof 2016). This conclusion is sup- 
ported by research showing that whereas in 2008 (the last year included in Hallin’s study) 
the broadcast networks devoted 220 minutes of air time to independent coverage of elec- 
tion issues, excluding those arising from candidates’ statements or debates, in 2016 that 
figure had dropped to 36 minutes. 
As Silvio Waisbord has noted, in its strongest form the argument from media logics 
presents them as an “inescapable” set of “expectations determined and embedded by 
the media” which “any institution or individual that ‘goes public’ need to meet” and 
comply with (Waisbord 2013, 183). The Trump campaign, however, offers a counter case 
that supports Nick Couldry’s argument; that far from being “fixed necessities”, media 
logics are “open to resistance and challenge, as well as complex variations and unevenness” 
(Couldry 2014, 38). 
Stromback (2008, 241) concedes that the increasing tabloidisation of political cover- 
age has been largely driven by market forces, and goes on to argue that “a strong public 
broadcasting system can help to create a counterweight towards the commercialization” 
which may slow or even reverse the process of mediatisation (2008, 242). Historically, 
public service broadcasting’s lack of dependence on advertising finance and its historic 
mission to educate and inform as well as entertain has indeed provided, at last potentially, 
a bulwark against the tabloidisation of programming and space for the interrogation of 
serious issues and minority positions. As we noted earlier, however, marketisation policies 
have whittled this space away by cutting public funding and pressuring public broadcasters 
to behave as though they were private companies, with the result that programming is 
increasingly pulled onto the terrain mapped out by the dominant commercial players. 
Opposing this requires an analysis of the full impact of commercialised cultural production 
coupled with a principled defence of the central role of public funding in providing essential 
alternative cultural resources for full and equal citizenship. The argument from media logics 
addresses consequences not causes. 
A full analysis of the play of corporate power within the communications system is 
also curtailed by the other core claim of the institutional variant of mediatisation theory; 
that “the media have become increasingly independent from politics” (Strömbäck and 
Van Aelst 2013, 342). The definition of “independent” at work here takes the historic shift 
in the organisation of the newspaper press as paradigmatic. As Stig Hjarvard notes: 
“whereas in the first part of the twentieth century the political press served in many 
countries as a mouthpiece for particular political interests, parties, and movements”, news- 
papers today “are primarily businesses governed by professional media considerations … 
technological affordances and market demands” (Hjarvard 2011, 122). The political influ- 
ence of press owners is conspicuously missing from this formulation. 
The career of Rupert Murdoch and News International offers an instructive case study 
(see Murdock 2017). The fact that Murdoch has endorsed whichever candidate for prime 
minister or president is most likely to advance his business interests in the countries he 
operates in, famously switching support from Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives to Tony 
Blair’s New Labour in Britain, could be interpreted as demonstrating his independence 
from party politics. But the category of politics is not exhausted by electoral competition. 
Cementing the terms of political debate over the long term is arguably more significant, 
 and there is substantial evidence that Murdoch has consistently deployed his news interests 
in Britain, Australia and the United States to vigorously promote neo-liberal perspectives 
and polices and to denigrate and pillory positions he opposes. Murdoch’s career also 
demonstrates another dimension of the connections between media and politics. 
As Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz point out in their formative discussion of 
mediatisation and democracy, “much ‘politics of substance’ is practiced away from media 
spotlights, behind the scenes, in the discrete rooms of parliament and government” (Maz- 
zoleni and Schulz 1999, 250). Successive investigations have revealed the energy Murdoch 
has devoted to cultivating political connections, his privileged personal access to ministers 
and his ability to turn this social capital to commercial advantage in avoiding public scrutiny 
of key media acquisitions. 
Characterising media as increasingly independent of party politics misses these wider 
articulations to the exercise of communicative power and influence in the political arena. 
 
 
From Representations to Infrastructures 
There is, however, another, more general problem with mediatisation theory’s ten- 
dency to identify the political domain with party politics and to focus on the organisation 
of media representations. There is no systematic analysis of the central role played by com- 
munication infrastructures in organising fundamental state activities. Even the most militant 
advocates of marketisation concede that continued public funding is required to finance 
the military and intelligence capabilities needed to discharge the state’s core functions of 
guaranteeing internal and external security. Both these functions have become progress- 
ively dependent on media systems but accounts of mediatisation miss crucial dimensions 
of these relations. 
Sara Maltby’s work on the mediatisation of the military, for example, chooses to focus 
exclusively on the media management strategies devised within the military to “appeal to, 
reassure, and elicit support from multiple audiences” including state agencies and military 
personnel (Maltby 2012, 255). In a media-saturated culture, struggles over media represen- 
tations and accounts are clearly central to any effort to secure funding and legitimacy but 
they do not exhaust the articulations between the organisation of the military and the 
organisation of communications. One of the defining characteristics of capitalist modernity 
has been the increasing resort to remote means of delivering armed force, from aerial bom- 
bardment to missile attacks, drone strikes and robotic assault troops, coupled with their 
increasing reliance on command, control and communication networks capable of coordi- 
nating and directing complex operations with a high degree of accuracy. This key develop- 
ment in the organisation of modern armed conflict has generated a substantial literature 
across the social sciences but has not so far been incorporated into mediatisation 
theory’s accounts of the increasing integration of media into institutional operations and 
strategies. 
A similar lacuna surrounds the transformation of intelligence. Since the First World 
War, the interception and decoding of communications traffic has assumed an increasingly 
central role in state surveillance of people and organisation judged to pose a threat to 
internal or external security. As Andrew Gamble (1994) noted towards the beginning of 
the neo-liberal era, the extension of “free” markets in the economic sphere has been 
accompanied by the consolidation of a “strong state” in the domains of policing and 
 intelligence. The rise of Islamic jihadism, the demonstrations of its destructive potential in 
the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington and the London underground bombings, 
and its assumed organisational shift from centralised to networked and freelance oper- 
ations have combined to move the monitoring of communications to the centre of intelli- 
gence gathering, licensing a shift from selective to saturation coverage in which everyday 
uses of the commercial Internet are routinely added to the stores of data collected by the 
security services for analysis and classification. Far from the media system becoming 
increasingly independent of the exercise of politics and political power, the consolidation 
of the strong state requires its increasing incorporation. There is an extensive body of 
research on this emerging regime of networked surveillance, but again the crucial chal- 
lenges it poses for the exercise of citizens’ rights and democratic politics have so far 
been left largely unexplored by proponents of marketisation theory 
 
 
 
Situated Action and Commercial Colonisation 
A failure to engage fully with the dynamics of marketised capitalism also characterises 
work on mediatisation that emphasises everyday agency rather than institutional logics. 
Andreas Hepp and Friedrich Krotz recently proposed that research should focus on 
“the level where mediatization becomes concrete, where people use media in specific con- 
texts with specific interests and intentions” (Hepp and Krotz 2014, 14). One of the contexts 
they mention, where everyday activity is shaped in crucial ways by access to digital net- 
works, is the stock exchange. Since the pioneering “Big Bang” in London in 1986 which 
replaced face-to-face interaction on the exchange floor with computerised screen-based 
dealing, financial transactions around the world have increasingly centred around global 
communications networks and algorithms that respond automatically to movements in 
prices, buying and selling at pre-set levels. The social enclaves based around these commu- 
nicative hubs clearly fit Hepp and Krotz’s conception of situated “mediatized worlds”. At the 
same time, the micro world of financial dealing is nested within a wider set of transform- 
ations in contemporary capitalism consequent upon the central role that financial insti- 
tutions have come to play in orchestrating economic life. This financialisation of 
capitalism is both a meta-process of change and an essential framing context for situated 
economic action. A full analysis needs to move between and link these levels, as Karen Ho 
does in her path-breaking ethnography of Wall Street investment banks (Ho 2009) which 
sets out to “situate global capitalism” by demonstrating how its core structures are main- 
tained through a repertoire of everyday performances (Ho 2005). In the light of the 2008 
financial crash we now need to add an account of how these performances, in turn, gener- 
ated a structural crisis. Exploring the ways communication systems are deployed is a necess- 
ary but not a sufficient condition for a full analysis (see Murdock 2015). 
Turning to popular use of digital networks finds mediatisation theorists continuing to 
emphasise the Internet’s democratising and equalising potential. Nick Couldry, for example, 
has drawn attention to the expanded opportunities it offers people to “tell important stories 
about oneself—to represent oneself as a social, and therefore potentially political, agent-in a 
way registered in the public domain” (Couldry 2008, 386). The major contemporary social 
media platform for these narratives is Facebook; Couldry notes this but does not engage 
with the point made by Andreas Hepp and colleagues that analysis needs to explore the 
“commodification of social relationships due to the commercial dynamics embedded in 
 Facebook” (Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2015, 317). There is a now a substantial literature on 
the way Facebook “monetises” the free labour of the site’s users and employs algorithms 
based on their past preferences to organise the material that appears on their personal 
page (see Bucher 2012; Fuchs 2013). This does not negate the value of exploring the ways 
individuals employ Facebook and other social media platforms as sites of self-expression 
and exploration and social connection, but it does underline the need, as Couldry (2008, 
375) himself emphasises, to interrogate the “heterogeneity of the transformations to 
which media give rise across complex and divided social space”. This space is defined by 
the tensions between personal projects, social mobilisations and corporate strategies and 
logics, and it is precisely the relations between them that analysis needs to focus on. 
Hepp’s own recent work has explored the social mobilisations set in motion by three 
groups of activists in the vanguard of developing new applications of digital technologies; 
the “maker” movement, the open data movement and enthusiasts of the quantified self. He 
presents them as pioneering communities “who understand media technology as a key 
instrument in facilitating ‘new’ and ‘better’ forms of collectivity” (Hepp 2016, 927). Closer 
investigation, however, reveals strong links to commercial players intent on promoting cor- 
porate rather than public interests. Personal devices designed to monitor health and fitness 
are central to the promotion of an ideal of the quantified self that valorises individual 
responses to warning signs of, for example, weight gain or infection. The result is a boost 
for the pharmaceutical industry rather than public health care. 
In his presentation of the “maker” movement, Hepp quotes, approvingly, the vision of 
the “next Industrial Revolution” promoted by Chris Anderson (2012), the editor of Wired, the 
house magazine of the Silicon Valley digital corporations. This envisages computerised 
design and 3-D printers “paving the way for … product development … carried out by col- 
lectives using media whose designs are then realised in robotised factories” (as quoted in 
Hepp 2016, 928). Hepp, like Anderson, presents this as a democratising movement, decen- 
tralising production. This rosy vision fails to explore why this coming “industrial revolution” 
is more likely to consolidate corporate control. Dominant uses of new “inventions” will be 
directed forcefully by the vigorous application of intellectual property law and promoted by 
the full armoury of corporate advertising and marketing. The increasing use of robotised 
production will generate substantial job losses, further reinforcing income and wealth 
inequalities and their attendant exclusion of the poor from full social inclusion. The 
routine installation of artificial intelligence in finished products will massively expand the 
range of “smart machines” integrated into the “internet of things” collecting and transmit- 
ting data on consumer preferences, personal habits and everyday activities on behalf of cor- 
porations but without the volition or control of users. 
Samsung’s new “smart” television sets, for example, automatically log the everyday 
conversations taking place in front of screen and make them available to interested 
corporations. 
The advent of the Internet of things forcibly reminds us that media are also assem- 
blies of physical infrastructures and machines which are manufactured under certain con- 
ditions, consume scarce resources in their design, production and use, and pose problems 
of waste and pollution in their disposal. As the editors of a recent collection on media tech- 
nologies note, “in communication and media scholarship … the materiality of devices and 
networks has been consistently overlooked” (Gillespie, Bockzkowski, and Foot 2014, 1). 
Work on mediatisation reproduces these absences. 
 As noted by a leading contributor to what we can now begin to call  the “material 
turn” in communication studies, “materiality is a complex multidimensional idea, and 
open to a variety of interpretations” (Lievrouw 2014, 25). I am using the term here in 
two senses: to highlight the need to investigate the raw materials and natural 
resources that are used up in producing and operating media machines and networks, 
and to return to the labour processes that transform these materials into commodities 
and networks. Recognising these materialities raises urgent questions about the relations 
between innovations in communication, the global circuits of capitalism and the gathering 
climate crisis. 
Smartphones and cloud computing point to these intersections with particular force 
and clarity. The work of Qiu (2014), Fuchs (2014) and others has highlighted the exploitative 
labour conditions that are hidden from view by the wall of glamorous images promoting 
the desirability of the finished products and celebrating their indispensability to the ways 
we live and wish to live. Maxwell and Miller (2012) have forced us to confront the full 
environmental consequences of present modes of producing, using and disposing of 
media machines and maintaining communication networks. 
The extensive and very concrete server farms concealed behind the metaphor of the 
immaterial cloud require huge amounts of energy to run and use massive volumes of water 
for cooling. The political decision to assign priority to these requirements has major impacts 
elsewhere. One of the reasons why the State of California has a permanent problem with 
drought is that it is home to the majority of the cloud computing facilities in the United 
States. 
Research on mediatisation has so far failed to engage with the material foundations 
on which contemporary communications systems are constructed, focusing instead on the, 
albeit crucial, ways in which communication networks are being employed to intensify sur- 
veillance of the civilian population by collecting and collating every trace that individuals 
leave as they move across digital webs of connection. 
 
 
 
Big Data and Deep Capitalism 
In a recent call for contributions to a conference on data, Hepp and Couldry 
argue that the increasing interweaving of “what we call media and communication … 
with the process of datafication in an environment of continuous and largely automated 
data processing” presents a pressing challenge for “critical communications and 
social research—indeed for critical social theory and political action generally” (Couldry 
and Hepp 2017, 1). They see this development as “part of a process of ‘deep mediatiza- 
tion’—in which the very elements and building-blocks from which the social is constructed 
are based in processes of mediatisation, accompanied by automated data processing” 
(2017, 1). 
In an earlier piece, however, Nick Couldry has acknowledged that “the intensification 
of connection and monitoring online” is being driven primarily by “deep economic pro- 
cesses” through which “The spaces of social life have become open to saturation by corpor- 
ate actors, directed at the making of profit and/or the regulation of action” (Couldry 2016). 
In common with Joseph Turow, this argument restores “the centrality of corporate power” 
to “the very heart of the digital age” (Couldry 2016). It follows from this that we need to 
begin analysis with the dynamics of “deep capitalism” rather than “deep mediatization”. 
 The pursuit of profit has always involved efforts to monitor consumers in the interests 
of maximising sales. Tastes and preferences have been logged, choices and purchases 
tracked, and social groups identified as targets to be aimed at more intensively on the 
basis of their spending power. But these efforts generated mostly bulk data, summative 
characterisations of market segments. Monitoring Internet activity allows corporations to 
construct personalised profiles. Individuals are no longer subsumed in statistical tables or 
descriptive categories; they are identified, sorted and labelled on the basis of their online 
clicks, likes and social connections. The construction of these digital doubles or doppelgan- 
gers provides corporations with unprecedented opportunities to reach into the most inti- 
mate corners of everyday life and direct attention and action. It is this deepening of 
market fundamentalism’s drive to reorder social life in the interests of capital that is 
shaping the processes that mediatisation research addresses. The harvesting of the same 
data streams by state security agencies adds a second moment of doubling, with individuals 
reclassified as either safe or potentially dangerous to social order. 
The democratic revolution which formed the political cornerstone of western moder- 
nity promised an end to the exercise of arbitrary power. People were no longer to be sub- 
jects of kings or emperors, subjected to their unchallenged authority. They were to become 
citizens, free and equal members of a shared moral community, with the right to participate 
in determining the laws and rules under which they consented to be governed. The corpor- 
ate capture of the Internet abandons this social contract. Firstly, by relentlessly addressing 
Internet users as consumers and conflating freedom with choices made in the marketplace, 
it continually undermines citizenship’s insistence that self-realisation carries a commitment 
to contributing to the quality of the collective resources that provide essential material, 
social and cultural supports for personal agency. Secondly, in the absence of effective regu- 
latory constraints, it has installed a highly asymmetric exchange designed to advance cor- 
porate rather than common interests and limit public debate on the exercise of economic 
power. Corporations know almost everything about our activities but we know almost 
nothing about theirs. Disclosure of their strategies and intentions is highly selective and 
carefully massaged by public relations. The bases of the algorithms directing user activity 
are protected by intellectual property regimes and commercial confidentiality. We do not 
have access to the digital information held on us or to the sorting systems that assign us 
to classificatory categories. They own our digital selves. This is the Faustian pact we have 
signed in return for access to expanded connectivity. 
Moving corporate strategies to the centre of analysis inevitably raises questions of 
responsibility. In an earlier characterisation of this latest stage in the unfolding process 
through “which our social world becomes entangled with media” as “deep mediatization”, 
Andreas Hepp offers an agent-centred account that constructs it as “a process promoted by 
specific groups of actors” (2016, 919). He is referring to the pioneer communities in the van- 
guard of developing new digital applications, mentioned earlier. 
The critical political economy perspective that I have been advancing here insists 
on starting with the interests and actions of the corporate elite and their political 
supporters, and detailing the way media and communications in advanced capitalism 
have been reconstructed to address the continuing crisis of accumulation. This is not to 
claim that the processes which mediatisation theory, in both its institutional and actor- 
oriented variants, has placed on the research agenda are not important and deserving of 
sustained investigation. Clearly they are. But it is to argue that we need to begin our analysis 
by placing developments and innovations in media and communication systems firmly in 
 the context of the overall shift in the organisation of advanced capitalism driven by market 
fundamentalist models of enterprise and growth. This dynamic has reconstructed the 
overall arena in which contests over the production and control of communication appli- 
cations and uses are fought out and has rewritten the central rules governing the terms 
of engagement. 
At the same time, it has generated new points of tension and contradiction and has 
opened new spaces of contest and struggle. As Nick Couldry (2016) notes, the “price” levied 
by deep capitalism operates “along dimensions that economists cannot count”. These 
dimensions are expressly discounted by the ruling insistence in orthodox economics that 
the “economy” is a bounded domain with its own logics of operation which are best under- 
stood and evaluated through mathematical models that rigorously exclude ethical judge- 
ment. As I have argued elsewhere, returning to the tradition of political economy allows 
us to challenge both these assumptions; firstly by arguing that capitalism orders social 
and power relations as well as economic action, and secondly by insisting that political 
economies are always and everywhere also moral economies (Murdock 2011). Whenever 
we enter into any relation of exchange we are confronted with ethical choices around com- 
plicity in the social and environmental costs incurred in the production, deployment and 
eventual disposal of the goods and services we use. The ruling ideology of market funda- 
mentalism has repeatedly attempted to relegate the questions of justice, equity and solidar- 
ity raised by these entanglements to the bottom of agendas for public debate, but, as Nick 
Couldry (2016) has noted, we are “beginning to sense the ethical limits of capitalism’s new 
game”. Until now, however, mediatisation researchers have paid little sustained attention to 
alternative moral economies and their implications for the regulation, reform and reorgan- 
isation of contemporary media and communications. 
The ascendency of commodification, commercialisation and consumerism is coun- 
tered by moral economies of public goods and gifting. The corporate drive to enclose 
the digital domain is opposed by renewed conceptions of the commons as a shared 
cluster of rights and resources (Murdock 2013). Work on mediatisation has so far had 
little to say about these counter moral economies. Accounts of collective initiatives and 
struggles, and contests over alternatives, have mostly disappeared into the cracks 
between structural analyses of changing relations between established institutional 
domains and explorations of media in everyday life. 
In a recent review of mediatisation theory, Nick Couldry has entertained the idea that 
“There are after all, alternatives to researching ‘mediatization’” and that one “would be to 
turn one’s research towards the wider transformations beyond media in which the media 
are somehow involved” (Couldry 2014, 33). I have argued here that a thorough understand- 
ing of the “wider transformations” in the organisation of capitalism is an essential prerequi- 
site for contemporary critical analysis. This does not displace mediatisation research, but 
without a sustained investigation of the dynamics and contradictions of marketised capit- 
alism it is impossible to fully account for the driving forces propelling and organising med- 
iatisation, to properly grasp their consequences for institutional and intimate life or to 
identify possible routes to challenge and change. 
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